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Introduction
The energy markets have undergone fundamental changes during the last years:
the rise of oil and gas prices, the progressive liberalization in many western
countries, various forms of re-nationalization in some producing countries, the
implementation of greenhouse gas reduction programmes, the multiplication of
geopolitical worries. This new context obviously requires a new approach.
At the beginning of 2007, the Commission proposed a new strategy, which was
broadly approved a little bit later by the European Council1. To make a proper
evaluation of this strategy, it is necessary to analyze first the constraints of this
new context. This is the objective of the present paper. It will thus deal, most
simply, with the evolution of energy demand (§ 1), of energy offer (§ 2), and of
the constraints linked to climate warming (§ 3). After a quick perusal of the
possibility of a crash (§ 4), it will then examine the adequacy of the new Euro-
pean strategy (§ 5). In synthesis, the conclusion is that the strategy is quite valid,
but the means of implementation remain obscure in some aspects.
Franklin DEHOUSSE2
1. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf (§§ 27-40).
2. Franklin Dehousse is professor at the University of Liège and judge at the Court of first instance
of the European Communities. This comment is strictly personal and does not represent the view of
the institutions to which he belongs.
This text is a revised version of a conference given to the Belgian social partners on September 3,
2007.5
1. The Demand
1.1. The increasing weight of non triad countries 
in the world economy
From a long team perspective, one of the most striking evolutions of the world
economy is the growing weight of non triad countries during the last 30 years.
Triad countries (USA, Europe and Japan) represent a decreasing part of world
GNP, going from 70% to 50%3. On the other side, the part of some emergent
economies, (China, Russia, India, Brazil), is steadily increasing. More strikingly
yet, from 2001 to 2006, the whole OECD countries represented only 34% of
GDP growth, while developing Asia alone accounted for nearly 50% (China
alone for 30%).
At first sight this could appear as a simple repetition of the past. Nonetheless,
such an analysis is strongly mistaken. The growth of the so-called Asian tigers
(Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand) has been impressive in the last dec-
ades. But it concerned only small (or sometimes micro) states. On the other side,
the growth of China and India, taken together, concerns at least two billions
people, who represent more or less a third of all living mankind. Such a massive
evolution is bound to have a tremendous impact on the world economy’s bal-
ance. This is evident for global world growth, commodities’ prices, and obvi-
ously the energy market.
1.2. The accelerating growth of energy demand
The energy demand has grown moderately but steadily in the world during the
last decades. From 1973 to 2005, global TPES (representing the demand of pri-
mary energy) went from 6.128 to 11.435 Mtoc4. One could thus say that the
global energy demand doubled more or less in 32 years.
The same could happen during the next 25 years. At least this is the main point
of the IEA projections from 2005 to 2030. Energy demand grows thus a little
bit more sharply. After going approximately from 6.000 to 12.000 in 32 years,
the forecast is from 12.000 to 18.000 in 25 years. The growth of energy demand
is then increasing. Retrospectively, one can thus see on the IEA graphs that
3. A. MADISSON, The World Economy: a Millennial Perspective, OECD, 2001.
4. IEA, World energy outlook, 2006.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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something happened in that domain around 2000. From this moment, the
growth of global energy demand becomes slightly sharper. This is largely linked
to the evolution of newly industrialising states, and primarily China.
1.3. The paradigm of China
Since 2000, China’s economic growth has got a heavy impact on the evolution
of world energy consumption. It is noteworthy that this impact has been so
strong that it has imposed the IEA to modify in a drastic way its global projec-
tions in its 2006 outlook5. The IEA raised its China 2030 forecast by 1.2 billion
tons of oil equivalent, which represents no less than a 63 percent upward revi-
sion.
It is important to observe the causes of this evolution and the repartition of
various energy sources6. The main cause of the consumption’s growth in China
lies in the incredible rise of heavy industrial production. One could believe that
it is linked to the rise of individual consumption or the rise of transport, but this
is not the case – yet. Personal transports provode a good example. The level of
car ownership in China today is the same as it was in the United States in 1910.
One can thus see that the Chinese car market is still at the infancy level. On the
other side, the rise of energy consumption linked to the growth of industrial
production has been phenomenal. For example, China is producing now more
or less a third of all world steel. This is a tremendous percentage. More gener-
ally, all industries, and especially heavy ones, have been growing outstandingly
in China. This is the main explanation for the rocketing increase of energy
demand – until now. Nonetheless, if individual revenues go on growing, addi-
tional sources of energy demand will inevitably appear during the next years and
decades.
1.4. First conclusion: the growth of energy demand 
is a worrying trend
As a first conclusion, the growth of energy demand has accelerated in the world
since the beginning of the 21st century. It is difficult not to perceive that evolu-
tion as a threat, or at least as a huge challenge. A part of this phenomenon could
be explained by conjectural factors. The economic (take-off) of countries as big
5. IEA, World outlook 2006, reference scenario.
6. On this topic, an essential reading is D. ROSEN and T. HAUSER, China energy – A guide for the
perplexed, Washington: IIE, 2007.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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and populated as China and India is bound to generate new imbalances in the
world economy. A part of this boom could thus be unsustainable, but another
part most likely is not. After all, China has been enjoying a more or less 10%
GNP yearly growth since the 1980s. Developed countries will most likely have
to live with this growth of demand during the next decades.9
2. The Offer
Demand growth is not in itself a problem in a market economy. Market mech-
anisms allow the economy to adapt. Nonetheless, the offer must be able to grow.
Otherwise prices are bound to rise. Some of the consequences of the growth of
energy demand are thus inescapable. The world economy will need to find new
sources of energy. But where are they?
2.1. Long time lags and heavy capital requirements
Energy adjustment requires time and money. At the risk of simplifying, one must
emphasize that energy markets are generally characterized by a very long time
frame for investment, a great importance of sunk costs, and very heavy invest-
ments. Pipelines, power plants, tankers and LNG terminals cost much, consti-
tute fixed outlays and require many years to reach pay-off7. Any adaptation of
the energy offer requires thus plenty of time. As the examples of the 1973 and
1980 oil shocks reveal, a sudden reduction of the existing offer cannot be
quickly compensated. This explains, by the way, the need that exists in the
energy market to benefit from a surplus capacity. Any break in the provisioning
of oil, gas or electricity can generate a tremendous amount of damage, price
spikes and irrational reactions8.
The increase of energy offer also requires a lot of money. Energy production and
distribution are highly capitalistic sectors. Infrastructures may function during
decades but they require a huge volume of up-front investment. From this per-
spective, the world economy enters a new phase of high capital requirements. A
lot of production units and infrastructures have been established during the
period of the oil shocks and their thereafter repercussions (1973-1981). These
production units and infrastructures are now quite old and need reinvestment
or replacement. For example, power plants in Europe are quite old. According
to the IEA, half current capacity – mostly coal-fired – could be retired by 2030.
Nuclear plants are also aging.
In 2005, the IEA estimated the required cumulative infrastructure investment
for 2004 – 2030 to 17 trillion dollars. This amount was increased to 20 trillion
the following year. Most interestingly, the IEA considered in 2006 that the level
7. For a long term perspective, see F. BANKS, Political Economy of Energy: An Introductory Text-
book, World Scientific Publishing, 2007.
8. Market forces do not tend to build spontaneously this surplus capacity. Consequently, this is an
essential objective of any regulatory system.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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of investment in the Middle East and North Africa countries was highly insuffi-
cient9.
The problem is aggravated by the return of price fluctuations in the oil market,
which has a collateral impact in the gas market. The stability mechanisms that
existed between 1935-1970 and 1986-2002 have disappeared. This acts as an
added brake on investments10.
In such a context, the adjustment of the offer to the increase of demand is clearly
not easy. This first problem is compounded, as we are going to see, by the rise
of new difficulties.
2.2. Less accessible sources
Firstly, it is important to realize that the biggest and easiest oil and gas fields
have already been discovered and exploited. This means that the discoveries are
now more difficult and more limited. On the oil market, the world now discov-
ers one barrel when three are consumed. On many fields, enterprises need now
more technology, more energy and more investments to keep oil and gas flow-
ing. This will make it more difficult to increase the production to respond to the
increase of demand.
Secondly, the production of oil and gas is generally peaking in most of the
OECD countries. This means that the external dependency of the OECD coun-
tries is growing, and that oil and gas must come from further countries. This
makes them costlier, and also makes the investment process more complex.
Dependency in itself is not a malediction, as long as it is reciprocal. Nonetheless,
it can become a problem when it is unbalanced, and implicates regions where
geopolitical problems and dictatorships abound. This is precisely the way the
European Union is going.
9. “Most of the reserves being there, these countries will be absolutely necessary to satisfy the
growing demand. About $1.5 trillion, or $56 billion per year, of investment are needed to expand
capacity and replace facilities that are retired. The reference IEA scenario would require a doubling
of the present rate of investment in these countries” (F. BIROL, World energy prospects and chal-
lenges, IEA, 2006, p. 3).
10. J. MITCHELL, A new era for oil prices, Chatham House, 2006, pp. 13-14.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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2.3. Increasing geopolitical uncertainties
Another growing difficulty comes as a matter of fact from the domain of geo-
politics. As we have seen, the primary energy reserves (especially oil and gas) are
dwindling in the OECD countries (USA, Europe and Japan), and more generally
in the non OPEC countries. The peak of oil production in the USA happened in
1970. The UK turned oil dependent again in 2005.
In itself, this phenomenon does not necessarily reduce the level of global energy
production. But it means that a growing compensation must be found in other
countries, and most of these countries present suffer from various forms of
instability. The most important oil and gas reserves are possessed by the Middle
East countries and after them by Russia. The general instability of the Middle
East is then a great source of worry, as is the growing tendency of Russia to use
the threat of energy cuts for political reasons in its dialog with the Western coun-
tries.
These uncertainties do not only create a disincentive for investment. They also
increase the costs of investment. In an uncertain context, investors – when they
invest – tend to ask for a better risk cover. They thus raise their required minimal
rate of return. These factors thus make more difficult the increase in production
that should respond to the increase of demand.
2.4. Increasing regulatory uncertainties
Another factor of uncertainty in the energy market may come from the opening
to competition of gas and electricity launched in Europe. On the one hand, com-
petition opens new ways of providing infrastructure and services. It increases the
pressure to increase productivity, and to reduce prices. But, on the other hand,
investors in huge projects have less guarantees to get their money back. This
observation is especially valid for traditional dominant operators. As the Euro-
pean example shows, deregulation of the national market can diminish strongly
their tendency to invest at home, and increase it marginally in other countries.
Deregulation in the energy sector is thus a very complex task, which must be
implemented with great care, permanent observation of market evolutions, and
which often supposes the creation of incentives or obligations to invest. This
always requires an effective regulatory system.
Regulatory uncertainties can thus become also a disincentive to invest, or a fac-
tor increasing the financial charges of investment. It can furthermore inciteTHE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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investors to prefer costlier solutions when they require higher functioning out-
lays but lower initial capital investment. These factors must be especially taken
into consideration in the present period because, as we have seen, the need for
renewal of plants and infrastructures becomes steadily more important.
One needs anyway to be careful about the benefits of a full deregulation in this
domain. Energy and telecommunications are fundamentally different. In 2001,
A. Kahn himself was expressing doubts about the impact of deregulation in this
sector11. As many previous experiences in various countries reveal, important
precautions must at least be taken12.
The present situation in the European Union, in any case, is not satisfactory. The
single market in gas and electricity does not really exist. The weight of dominant
operators is quite obvious. The quality of national regulations is highly variable.
After a transitory period, prices have risen, and this rise does not always seem
connected to objective factors (price of fossil sources or investments). The
increase of investments has not been obvious until now13. The functioning of the
futures’ market is not very impressive in the field of energy. The need for a
review of the existing EU regulatory framework is obvious.
2.5. The threat of the oil peak
During the last ten years, an increasing attention has been given to the state of
the oil (and gas) reserves, and their future perspectives. A progressive consensus
has emerged to warn about the dwindling of new discoveries, the exhaustion of
existing fields, and the probability of an oil (and later gas) peak. According to
most estimates, the oil peak is likely to happen between 2005 and 202014.
According to some, it has even already begun15.
11. “I am worried about the uniqueness of electricity markets. I’ve always been uncertain about
eliminating vertical integration. It may be one industry in which it works reasonably well.’’ (IHT,
2001).
12. See J. HENNINGSEN, Rising to the energy challenge: key elements for an effective EU strategy,
EPC, 2007.
http://www.epc.eu/en/pub.asp?TYP=TEWN&LV=187&see=y&t=13&PG=TEWN/EN/detailpub&
l=12&AI=553
13. It becomes strategically important for the EU to assess the volume of investments and the
future capacity of production. Regrettably, this preoccupation does not appear enough yet in the
numerous reports of the European Commission.
14. See http://www.peakoil.net/ and references.
15. From this perspective, one lust observe the graphs of the supply outlook of oil published by the
Energy watch group: http://www.energywatchgroup.org/fileadmin/global/pdf/EWG_Oilreport_10-
2007.pdfTHE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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The notion of oil peak must not be been as an abrupt end of oil use. It simply
means that the world will not be able to produce more and that the volume of
oil delivered on the market will progressively diminish. This will not necessarily
– if properly managed – bring an immediate revolution but, taken in a medium
term perspective, it will certainly amount to one. This would already have been
the case in a market where energy consumption grows on a regular basis. It will
be more the case if the present acceleration of consumption goes on16.
A long debate about the precise moment of the oil peak is not very useful. Most
analysts consider now that the peak is a certainty, and that it is going to occur
in a foreseeable future. Consequently, immediate initiatives are absolutely nec-
essary. As we have seen before, energy is by definition a long term sector. Mod-
ifying the production or the consumption patterns requires much time.
From this point of view, an interesting study has analyzed the costs and delays
of a possible mitigation strategy in the United States17. It indicated that a switch
towards less consuming and more environmental car models would require at
least 15 years. It would also require a staggering amount of 175 billions dollars.
2.6. Second conclusion: the energy offer will most 
likely not be able to balance the growth of 
energy demand
Far from being comforting, the analysis of the various parameters of the energy
offer indicates that it will be far from easy to compensate the increase of
demand. In fact, problems on the demand side will be compounded in the next
decades by additional problems on the offer side. Two facts are especially wor-
risome. Firstly, there are too many problems; secondly, some of them present a
structural nature. Energy investments require time and money, but both can be
found. The two most important zones for the future, i.e. the Middle East and
Russia, suffer from important geopolitical uncertainties, but these could be cor-
rected (though diplomats can certainly testify that it will not be easy). On the
other side, the fossil energy sources are diminishing now in the OECD countries.
This cannot be changed. Oil production will begin to diminish in the world
during the next 20 years. This also cannot be changed. Furthermore, a generally
16. See R. HIRSCH, The inevitable peaking of world oil production, Bulletin of the Atlantic Council
of the United States, October 2005. http://www.acus.org/docs/051007-Hirsch_World_Oil_Produc-
tion.pdf
17. See R. BEZDEK, R. WENDLING and R. HIRSCH, Economic impact of US liquid fuel mitigation
option, 2006. http://www.scag.ca.gov/rcp/ewg/documents/EconomicImpactsofUSLiquidFuelMiti-
gationOptions.pdfTHE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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tighter relationship between energy demand and offer generates price instability.
This has been apparent since 2000 on the oil and the gas markets. This instabil-
ity is costly in itself, as it impedes the investment process.
In conclusion, if it is difficult to satisfy the increase of energy demand, prices will
have to increase. Naturally, a tremendous technological progress could modify
radically this situation, but technological progress in energy also requires much
time. The intensity and the speed of the price increases remain difficult to antic-
ipate, but it would be worthwhile to begin to prepare ourselves for this chal-
lenge.15
3. Climate Warming
3.1. Climate warming is a reality
Since 1997, the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) has produced
increasingly affirmative reports about the warming of the climate. According to
the IPCC 2007 reports, it is now absolutely clear – and undeniable – that human
activities are at the source of important present evolution of the world climate.
The temperature is rising more or less everywhere. The North Pole ice is slowing
melting (giving unprecedented access to ground resources). The probability of
strong weather accidents and rise of the seas along the coasts is increasing stron-
gly18.
In spite of a few remaining resistances, a quasi consensus reigns now in the
scientific circles to acknowledge the reality of climate warming and the impor-
tance of its potential consequences on the human way of life19. In a significant
change, many important enterprises, though this would increase their con-
straints, are now calling the governments to take substantial measures against
climate change20.
3.2. Climate change is accelerating
According to the IPCC fourth assessment report published in 2007, the world
anthropogenic GHG emissions went from 39 to 49,0 GtCO²/year from 1990 to
200421. There has thus been no stabilisation at all, on the contrary. According
to several reports presented in 2007, climate warming seems to happen even
quicker than foreseen. The latest reports are thus worst than the worst case
scenario of the IPCC. “The emissions growth rate since 2000 was greater than
for the most fossil-fuel intensive of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change emissions scenarios developed in the late 1990s”22.
18. See the IPCC fourth assessment report, released in 2007.
19. http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm
Against the general consensus, see B. LOMBORG, The skeptical environmentalist, 2007.
20. See the declaration “Caring for Climate: The Business Leadership Platform”, released in 2007.
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Environment/CLIMATESTATEMENT_revised_
postsummit.pdf.
21. General summary for policymakers, p. 4.
22. M. RAUPACH et alii, Global and regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions, PNAS, 2007,
p. 1.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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This evolution could be linked to various elements, for example the fact that
oceans absorb less of new greenhouse gases that had been initially anticipated,
or that there can be cumulative accelerations in the process of warming. How-
ever, at least a part of this evolution is certainly linked to the changes in the
energy market. As we have seen, the price of oil and gas has begun to rise around
2000. Coal has thus become comparatively more competitive. A growing use of
coal has thus happened, especially in the new emerging economies, and most
especially in China23. The acceleration of energy consumption has consequently
provoked a more than proportional acceleration of the emission of greenhouse
gases.
3.3. The role of non triad countries is increasing
Another important lesson of the last years is that the role of new industrialised
states in the emissions of greenhouse gases is quickly increasing. China, here too,
is a very impressive illustration24. Its emissions are already higher than those of
all Europe (OECD members) and they will quickly become higher than those of
the USA25. According to the IEA, the world emission of greenhouse gases, linked
to energy, if they follow the present trends, should double purely and simply
between 1990 and 203026. “Half of the projected increase in emissions comes
from new power stations, mainly using coal and mainly located in China and
India”.
Following this evolution, the threat of climate change is growing, but it is also
becoming more difficult to solve. There are as a consequence more parties, with
more different levels of development, which must reach an agreement. From
that perspective, it is also important to notice that though the new industrialis-
ing countries increase strongly their emissions, their per capita emissions remain
much lower. Even on the basis of the (very strong) present trends, the per capita
emissions of China will only reach 60% of those of the OECD in 2030.
23. According to the US sources, between 2000 and 2004, the world coal consumption went from
5100 to 6098 million short tons (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb1115.html). “Coal pro-
vides about 70 percent of China’s energy needs: the country consumed some 2.4 billion tons in
2006 – more than the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom combined. In 2000, China
anticipated doubling its coal consumption by 2020; it is now expected to have done so by the end
of this year (E. Economy, The great leap backward?, Foreign Affairs, 2007.
24. See generally, OECD, Environmental Performance Review of China, 2007.
25. D. ROSEN and T. HAUSER, China energy, IIE, 2007. According to the Netherlands Environmen-
tal Assessment Agency, China has even already overtaken the USA as the world biggest emitter in
2006: see http://www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissions
USAinsecondposition.html
26. IEA, Energy outlook, 2006.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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3.4. The Kyoto system is not sufficient
The previously mentioned evolutions bring easily the conclusion that the system
established in 1997 in the Kyoto protocol, though useful, is not sufficient yet.
One can discuss the political, technical or economic reasons of this insufficiency,
but the insufficiency itself cannot be denied. Global emissions are not going
down, though the reality and the extent of the threat is now widely acknowl-
edged. How unlikely or impossible that may seem, the only solution seems to
increase the constraints in a new internationally negotiated framework, hope-
fully as quickly as possible.
Defining a post-Kyoto regime – hopefully much before 2012 – will be difficult.
Reaching an agreement between developed countries has already been difficult,
so difficult that the United States does not participate to the system yet. Reach-
ing an agreement between developed and developing countries will be more dif-
ficult. Establishing a balance of duties between societies enjoying a highly differ-
ent level of development will be a very tall order indeed. This tall order will be
compounded by the progressive acknowledgement that there are two problems.
Firstly, the Kyoto objectives will not be reached. On the contrary, the world has
seen an acceleration of the GHG emissions. Secondly, these targets are most
probably insufficient.
It is important to realize the scope of the required effort. Very approximately,
the planet has the ability to capture around 3,2 billion tons CO2 per year. The
present volume of the emissions of CO2 is more or less the double, and they are
growing at 3% per year. Carbon is thus stocked in the atmosphere in increasing
quantities, currently around 370 ppm. Most climate scientists consider 450 ppm
as the relatively safe barrier. Above that, uncertainties become greater and 550
ppm indicates the real danger zone. Stabilizing at 550 ppm would already
require enormous reforms. The world emissions should in that hypothesis peak
at 11 billion tons around 2030. This would represent a per capita emission of
1,2 ton of carbon per year. In Europe, this would require a 65% reduction of
the present per capita emissions. When such an objective will be integrated in
the energy price – and it will be inevitable one day –, this will engender a tre-
mendous change in the energy market.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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3.5. Third conclusion: climate warming will make 
any response to the growth of energy demand 
more difficult
Climate change imposes to reduce drastically the world greenhouse gases emis-
sions during the next decade. After this, the evolution will be much more diffi-
cult to correct, due to the accumulation of gases. In such a short term frame-
work, it is difficult to contemplate another solution than a much reduced use of
carbon fossil energy sources. Energy consumption is the essential cause of green-
house gases. Mainly, there is thus a need to reduce the use of oil, gas and coal
(nuclear energy does not present, from the point of view of climate warming, the
same problems).
Far from offering solutions, the evolution of the oil and gas sectors risks aggra-
vating the problem of climate warming. Oil has to be found deeper and further.
Gas comes from increasingly distant sources. This requires more money – and
energy. Oil shale and ethanol also presently require a huge volume of energy to
be produced.
One simple (and agreeable) path would be to reduce the GHG emissions wit-
hout reducing the energy consumption. This explains the present high interest
for various experiments of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), essentially
in the use of coal. Nonetheless, until now, this process remains at the experimen-
tal phase. This is at best a medium term solution, but the problem is now unfor-
tunately urgent.
Clearly, the growing threat of climate warming will aggravate the problems of
the adjustment of energy offer to demand. The offer of energy could be increa-
sed but, most of the time, this increase will produce a strong collateral damage
on the climate. The world does not only need new energy sources, but these new
sources must also imperatively be sustainable. In synthesis, the options are
already very limited, but climate warming still reduces them. The conjunction of
the two threats explains the popularity of the clean forms of renewable energy.
It also explains the need to reexamine the necessity of nuclear energy27.
Finally, the difficulty of defining a new post-Kyoto regime adds a new layer of
uncertainty around the adaptation of the energy market to the growth of
demand. Investment is more difficult for the enterprises if they do not know the
price and the volume of the authorized GHG emissions.
27. One must see in that perspective the decision of the UK government to modify its policy to
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4. The Probability of a Crash
It may seem curious at first sight to consider a crash likely in the new worldwide
energy context. Nevertheless, such possibility must be contemplated. Energy
demand is growing for structural reasons which could go on for a long time. The
growth of energy offer, which would be an easy answer, seems to encounter
structural obstacles. During the next decades, these obstacles will be com-
pounded by the increasing constraints of climate warming. Most energy sources
rely on fossil fuels, and most of them produce greenhouse gases.
The adaptability of market forces must of course not be underestimated. One
can always hope that market forces will naturally find a solution. However, at
the top of the three cumulative constraints already mentioned, one must still
take two other factors into consideration, which are two fundamental charac-
teristics of the energy market.
Firstly, the time frame of the energy market is abnormally long. Before the deci-
sion to build a power plant or a pipeline and their opening, many years can be
spent. In the short term, the offer is quite inelastic. Secondly, energy markets are
often quite imperfect. They are characterized by strong network effects, domi-
nant positions, non assumed collective costs, and high security requirements.
These factors make public intervention inevitable, in a way or another, direct or
indirect. This generates a constant pressure in favour of public intervention. So,
to adapt to a new structural context, the energy markets need a very efficient
regulatory system. Various experiences indicate how difficult it is to establish an
efficient synergy between public and private actors in a complex domain.
There are thus many conditions to fulfil if we want to prevent an energy shock.
One can always hope that they will all simultaneously be fulfilled. Nonetheless,
this does not appear as the most likely outcome. Consequently, if the world
energy demand keeps on growing and the offer is unable to adapt smoothly,
some investments will reveal themselves inadequate. Presently, factories, sky-
scrapers, homes, cars, roads, airplanes and holydays resorts are built on a prom-
ise of accessible energy that could not be fulfilled.
Considering the cumulative constraints imposed by the energy market and the
climate warming, this could produce quite a shock indeed. One just needs to
remember the macroeconomic consequences of the 1973 and 1980 shocks, but
as a permanent blow this time and no more as a provisional one. Due to the
inflexibility of demand and the tendency to panic in various corners, there will
be a general feeling of impoverishment, a sudden rise of prices, and popularTHE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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pressure for quite brutal administrative measures. All this will create a tide of
disorientation in the enterprises28.
28. Considering the importance of the macroeconomic impact, such an episode would quickly
become a huge challenge for the Eurozone, where it could introduce more divergence between the
Member States. From this point of view, the European Central Bank would be well inspired to
invite the participating Member states to guarantee a strong surplus margin in their energy produc-
tion and to integrate more the management of their strategic reserves. It should also prepare some
contingency planning. 21
5. The EU Strategy: A Good Approach that 
Needs More Means
5.1. The implications of the climate/energy threat 
for the European Union
Before examining the recent strategy adopted by the European Council, it is
necessary to ponder on its impact on the European Union’s policies.
The threat will likely bring a new legitimacy to the EU
Environment is naturally a domain where interdependency is high between the
States. Consequently, the international coordination of their action presents a
strong added value. This remark is still more valid for the threat of climate
warming, which has already provoked an unusual level of international cooper-
ation. This also applies at the level of EU, of course.
This line of reasoning is equally valid in the domain of energy. A common EU
approach in energy research can bring both more means and more efficiency in
their use. A common approach in the building of networks can reduce bottle-
necks, external dependency, risks of breakdowns, and finally costs. A common
approach of the market regulation increases efficiency and offers a stable frame-
work to the required investments.
One can thus safely conclude that climate warming and energy will be the new
strategic priority of the EU integration during the next decade.
The threat will likely bring a new balance in the competition 
framework
Most likely, the threat will constrain the EU institutions to develop new rules,
where the role of public targets (both at the EU and national levels) will be
important. For this reason, it is important to anticipate. This anticipation will
allow the protection of market mechanisms as much as possible. Otherwise, in
a period of acute crisis, there will be clamours to adopt blunt administrative
mechanisms very quickly.
The energy markets are already characterized by imperfect competition. Envi-
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properly taken into consideration by the markets. The combination of energy
and climate problems will thus provoke a pressure for more public regulation.
This is already quite apparent in the strategy adopted by the European Council
in March 2007. Defining targets of 20% renewable energy and 10% of biofuels
for 2020 looks a lot like a public planning exercise. The same can perfectly be
said for a target of 20% unilateral reduction of greenhouse gases for 2020. If
the markets could spontaneously provide this result, it would not be necessary
to establish it as a norm.
In such a context, the balance between competition principles and public inter-
ests will sometimes require subtle adjustments. Those familiar with the imple-
mentation of competition rules in the energy sector already know that the secu-
rity of provision can justify the conclusion of long term agreements that would
be unjustifiable in other sectors, or that the need for tremendous investments in
new networks can justify the attribution of exclusive rights29. If energy security
and massive investments in renewable energy become essential objectives during
the near future, one can also expect that public subsidies aiming at these results
will increase.
5.2. The 2007 European strategy is adapted to the 
new challenger but it still lacks means
Considering this new context, the European Council has adopted a strategy in
March 2007. On one side, this strategy certainly represents a substantial
progress in diverse aspects. On the other side, nonetheless, the means of this
strategy have hot been identified with the same precision than its objectives. The
persistence or disappearance of this discrepancy during the next years, will con-
dition the final success of the strategy.
Progresses
Five advantages at least are obvious.
(1) This is the first time that the environment and the energy policies have been
so strongly integrated in a single and substantial program of action. (2) The
primacy of environmental consideration has been acknowledged. Improving the
29. One must be sure nonetheless that such agreements or rights bring added investments and not
higher monopoly profits. This is another fundamental objective of any regulatory system.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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energy situation by aggravating the climate situation (which is alas simple and
even sometimes tempting) is not considered as an option. (3) The energy policy
is no more limited to the establishment of the single market. Other forms of
public measures, as research and networks, have been integrated. (4) A few
ambitions targets have been defined. They encompass: a unilateral reduction of
greenhouse gases of 20% (30% in the context of an international agreement)
from their 1990 level in 2020, 20% renewable energy in 2020, 10% biofuels in
2020. (5) The synergy between the internal energy problem and the EU foreign
policy has finally got the attention it deserves.
Remaining uncertainties
Some uncertainties, though, remain.
(1) One can wonder whether it would not be better to put less emphasize on
renewable energy and more on energy efficiency. The targets concerning renew-
able energy have been difficult to reach until now and the new ones are very
ambitious (concrete measures will be discussed for the first time in 2008 and
must bring results in 2020). On the other side, previous experiences teach us
that the potential of energy efficiency has generally been underestimated. One
can also worry whether there are not too many targets, which will make them
more difficult to reach. Furthermore, the added value of biofuels regarding cli-
mate warming is far from been proven.
(2) In the targets become serious, they will inevitably, as the repartition of ETS,
provoke intense conflicts about the repartition of charges between the Member
States. One huge simplification would be to prepare a system based at least on
an equal level of GHG emissions per capita, and from that point introduce as
many market mechanisms as possible between Member States, and even in a
second phase between persons.
(3) There is a need to invest more at the EU level, at least in two domains. The
first one is research. Energy research costs a lot and it is essential to regroup
more the national initiatives and gather a critical mass. For the same reason, an
audit of previous achievements should be made. Increasing spending without
taking care of its return has no meaning. The Commission has already proposed
substantial changes, but more integration is required. The second domain is
European energy networks, because markets and investments still remain pri-
marily national. One can but hope that the beginning reflection of the EU bud-
get will bring positive results here.THE COMING ENERGY CRASH AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
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(4) In any framework, it is essential to encourage a better price system. This has
different implications. Except for acute social problems, the governments must
not try to compensate in various ways the rise of energy prices. This would be a
disincentive to invest in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and also an incen-
tive to aggravate climate warming. A real price for GHG must also be estab-
lished. Otherwise, the competitiveness of renewable and nuclear energy is arti-
ficially reduced. Finally, the taxation systems must be more discriminative
between renewable and non renewable energy, light and heavy consumption
products.
(5) The most essential point, however, remains that the growth of energy
demand must be braked if we want to reduce the probability and/or depth of
future economic crises. During the next 10 years, there will be many obstacles
on the path of any stable and sustainable increase of the energy offer. There are
– maybe – some technological solutions for the medium term or the long term
but they do not exist in the short term (and they will require a huge mobilization
of money). Each price rise that we accept, or even provoke in a steady and pre-
dictable way, is an insurance that we take for the stability of our climate and our
economic system in the medium term.